A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China
Do Chinese cities compete for investments with lax environmental law enforcement? The here presented study suggests that this is true for some municipalities but not all of them. Based on data for 126 key environmental protection cities and regional economic hubs between 2010 and 2012 we show that economic decentralization and political centralization both shape spatial patterns of compliance with environmental transparency legislation. Our results give reason to suppose that the Chinese economy moved beyond homogenous preferences for low-cost regulatory arrangements. The emerging jurisdictional interaction is in line with a Tiebout sorting process, where cities compete with diverse factor packages to attract an optimal amount of investments.
New article by Stefan Brehm, researcher here at the Centre, and Jesper Svensson , alumnus from the Masters Programme in Asian Studies and currently doing a DPhil at the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, published in the Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science.